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The Stoic Conception of the Sage 
Abstract 
In this Thesis I discuss the conception of the sage in Stoic philosophy. The Stoics describe 
the sage as the embodiment of wisdom; ignorant of nothing; the only one who has 
knowledge and expertise; the only one who is fully rational, virtuous and happy; and, 
finally, as a person who does not have emotions, but only eupatheiai, or “good feelings”. 
I discuss each of these features of the sage and show that the concept of a sage is 
constructed out of the main concepts of the entire Stoic philosophical system. It is a 
theoretical concept which is the consequence of their central philosophical tenets.  
Key words: cognition, emotions, feelings, happiness, knowledge, sage, Stoics, virtue, 
wisdom 
 
 
Stoičko poimanje mudraca 
Sažetak 
U ovome radu raspravljam o koncepciji mudraca u stoičkoj filozofiji. Stoici opisuju 
mudraca kao utjelovljenje mudrosti, kao nekoga tko nikad ne očituje neznanje, kao jedino 
biće koje posjeduje znanje, koje je u potpunosti racionalno, vrlo i sretno te, konačno, kao 
osobu koja nema emocije, nego samo eupatheiai, to jest “dobre osjećaje”. Raspravljam o 
svakoj od tih značajki mudraca i pokazujem da je pojam mudraca konstrukcija sačinjena 
iz glavnih pojmova cjelokupnoga stoičkog filozofskog sustava. Riječ je o teoretskom 
pojmu koji je posljedica njihovih središnjih filozofskih postavki. 
Ključne riječi: emocije, mudrac, mudrost, osjećaji, spoznaja, sreća, stoici, vrlina, znanje
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. The allurement of Stoicism 
Stoic sage: the final frontier of this Thesis. These next chapters will be the voyages of 
one human mind. It was a one year mission: to explore a strange old world, where new 
form of life was invented in ancient Stoic civilization – the wise or the sage. I would not 
say that this was a bold mission, where no man has gone before, but it was certainly vivid 
enough to bring a new perspective on the concept of the sage. In the 21st century, Earth 
is still occupied by humans, and roughly there are three types of humans: ones who use 
the term “Stoic” in a proper way (let’s call them “savants” or just “philosophers”), others 
who try to instantiate the term “Stoic” by imitating the attitude and sometimes even the 
hand gesture of “live-long-and-prosper” made popular by Mr. Spock in Star Trek (let’s 
call them “the ones who aspire to become savants”), and those who do not know the 
meaning of the term “Stoic”, but who use phrases like “Stoic endurance” or “Stoic 
calmness”, even though, when the term “Stoic” is singled out from the phrase, they do 
not recognize it and cannot decode its meaning (let’s call them the “fools”).1 The Stoics 
would approve such categorization with different terminology and with one category less. 
They would say that only the wise have knowledge, whereas the fools have only opinions. 
In Stoic world, there are only two types of people – sages and fools. Those who are in 
progress towards wisdom are still fools. In today’s world, the eliminated group of those 
in progress make the majority of human population, provided that they are interested in 
making progress. The reason why the eliminated group is at the center of interest is 
because Stoic philosophy is going through a revival in popular culture. It is partially so 
due to the sense of the word “Stoic”, and probably entirely so due to its allure and 
lucrative potential as evidenced in popular culture. 
In our culture, the term “Stoic” and its cognates have come to refer to the state of 
being calm, steady and emotionless. The Oxford English Dictionary defines “Stoic” as 
“one who practices repression of emotions, indifference to pleasure or pain, and patient 
endurance”, and the popular representation of Stoic philosophy, both in the past and 
                                                
1  On Mr. Spock as a Stoic, see Thorsrud 2008, who contrasts Spock’s attitude towards emotions as 
impediments to a good life with Data’s, who thinks that life is better with moderate amount of emotions. A 
more skeptical view of Spock as a Stoic is found in Farren 2014, who thinks that Spock cannot be a genuine 
Stoic. 
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today, portrays the Stoic as a person of such a posture. For Stoics, emotions or passions 
arise from false beliefs, and emotions like fear and distress should be abandoned since 
they are obstacles to virtuous life. As opposed to the popular conception of an Epicurean, 
as someone who indulges in sensual pleasures, modern associations of “Stoics” are not 
misleading with regards to the philosophical origins of the term (see Baltzly 2014). Even 
though modern associations are not completely misleading, they seem superficial in 
comparison with the contents of the original ancient Stoicism. The popular social status 
that the Stoics enjoy is far from its origin and the same goes for the Epicureans: when 
someone advocates an Epicurean ideal, from the perspective of popular culture, this will 
be considered as a whimsy choice. On the other hand, being a Stoic, or promoting Stoic 
ideals, is considered to be desirable, chiefly because in popular culture Stoic behavior 
manifests itself in active repression of emotions, calmness, etc. In certain corners of 
popular culture, to be in a state without emotions is considered appealing and is thought 
to be achievable through psychotherapy or certain techniques of meditation.2  
The ancient Stoics, however, restricted virtuous or meaningful and happy life to 
one type of people only – the sages. Popular culture, on the other hand, promotes Stoic 
repression of emotions, steadiness in accepting what is inevitable without posturing a 
Stoic sage and without accurately following ancient Stoicism. Mr. Spock would say that 
“insufficient facts always invite danger”, but a sufficient fact is that there is no other 
Western philosophical tradition that made such an impact on modern popular culture as 
Stoicism did (except, perhaps, Christianized versions of Platonism). From the popular 
point of view, Mr. Spock is the embodiment of Stoic posture even though he is far from 
being called a Stoic sage or even a Stoic with the capital S. He represses emotions, accepts 
what is inevitable (“What is necessary is never unwise”), does not get emotional or 
illogical.  
 The selling point that makes the content of Stoic philosophy more approachable 
and interesting is the recipe for happiness that it offers, even though it requires eradication 
of pleasure, desire and other emotions. For the Stoics, emotions should be eliminated 
from decision-making process because they are false beliefs. Albert Ellis, the founder of 
                                                
2 On the other hand, one might ask why anybody would want to live this way. If life without emotions is 
an appealing choice, why should we study and practice Stoicism instead of taking some chemical 
tranquilizer? For consequences of the distortion of the meaning of original ancient Stoicism, see Brennan 
2005: 3-9. 
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rational emotional behavior therapy (REBT), used the Stoic idea that emotions are false 
beliefs in developing REBT. The main assumption of REBT is that the origins of mental 
disturbance are not to be found in external situations but in the perspective that one 
chooses when one decides to react to them. Ellis chose a sentence from Epictetus as a 
slogan of his therapy, “Man is disturbed not by things, but by the views he takes of them” 
(The Encheiridion 5). According to REBT, by changing the attitude and altering the 
perspective, one can cope with mental disturbance. The approach that Ellis offers is 
basically the core of Stoic philosophy. By disregarding good old-fashioned reading and 
first-hand inquiry, and transforming philosophical thoughts and arguments into easily 
understandable quotations, Ellis and many like him made Stoicism more appealing for 
many people who are keen on self-help subdivision of popular culture. (The same can be 
said of the so-called logotherapy, a school in psychotherapy founded by Viktor Frankl.)  
The most ambitious attempt at reviving the ancient Stoicism is a project launched 
several years ago at the University of Exeter. The central part of their project is called the 
Stoic Week, during which the savants of Stoicism are trying to make those who aspire to 
become savants more aware on how to study and use Stoicism in everyday life. 
Thousands of people from all around the world, some by being physically and some by 
being virtually present, participate in the Stoic Week. Its most important part is a 
conference called “Stoicon”. In 2016, Stoicon was held in New York, where more than 
three hundred people gathered to listen and talk to various speakers, including experts in 
ancient Stoicism such as Julia Annas and Christopher Gill (one of the initiators of the 
Stoic Week), author Jules Evans, media strategist Ryan Holiday, etc. Philosopher 
Massimo Pigliucci, one of the participants of the Stoicon, summarized the goal of the 
Stoic Week by describing his daily routine:  
I begin the day by retreating in a quiet corner of my apartment to meditate. Stoic 
meditation consists in rehearsing the challenges of the day ahead, thinking about 
which of the four cardinal virtues ... one may be called on to employ and how. 
I also engage in an exercise called Hierocles’ circle, imagining myself as part of 
a growing circle of concern that includes my family and friends, my neighbors, 
my fellow citizens, humanity as a whole, all the way up to Nature itself. 
I then pass to the “premeditatio malorum,” a type of visualization in which one 
imagines some sort of catastrophe happening to oneself (such as losing one’s job), 
and learns to see it as a “dispreferred indifferent,” meaning that it would be better 
if it didn’t happen, but that it would nonetheless not affect one’s worth and moral 
value. ... 
Finally, I pick a Stoic saying from my growing collection ..., read it to myself a 
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few times and absorb it as best as I can. The whole routine takes about ten minutes 
or so. 
Throughout the rest of the day, my Stoic practice is mostly about mindfulness, 
which means to remind myself that I not only I live “hic et nunc,” in the here and 
now, where I must pay attention to whatever it is I am doing, but, more 
importantly, that pretty much every decision I make has a moral dimension, and 
needs to be approached with proper care and thoughtfulness. For me this often 
includes how to properly and respectfully treat students and colleagues, or how to 
shop for food and other items in the most ethically minded way possible (there 
are apps for that, naturally). 
Finally, my daily practice ends with an evening meditation, which consists in 
writing in a diary ... my thoughts about the day, the challenges I faced, and how I 
handled them. I ask myself, as Seneca put it in “On Anger”: “What bad habit have 
you put right today? Which fault did you take a stand against? In what respect are 
you better?” (Pigliucci, 2015) 
 
At first sight, Pigliucci is strictly holding on to different recommendations and attitudes 
that are characteristic of the original ancient Stoicism. He is thinking of “the four cardinal 
virtues” – indeed, the Stoics followed Plato in considering wisdom, courage, moderation, 
and justice as the most important virtues.3 He begins the day with meditation – which is 
the practice introduced by some Roman Stoics, notably Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius. 
Furthermore, he engages in an exercise called Hierocles’ circle. Hierocles, a Stoic from 
the 2nd century, described the individual life through a series of circles, which begins with 
human mind, individual and extended family, and ends with humanity as a whole (LS 
57G). Premeditatio malorum or pre-rehearsal of future evils is a Stoic consolation 
technique, which consists in one’s “looking far ahead to misfortunes that are to come, and 
this makes their arrival easier to beat” (Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 3.29). 
“Dispreferred indifferent” is a technical term in Stoic ethics – to be discussed below, in 
Chapter 4 – which refers to a class of things that are neither good nor bad, but which 
should be dispreferred, like illness, poverty, and the like. The idea that pretty much every 
decision we make has a moral dimension, and needs to be approached with proper care 
and thoughtfulness cannot, strictly speaking, be found in the ancient Stoic sources, but 
may be taken as a reasonable interpretation of the idea that thoughtfulness in action is an 
important feature of the Stoic sage. Finally, quotations from Seneca are good examples 
of the way in which Roman culture understood the position of the original Stoics. 
                                                
3 They hold that these virtues are inseparable. More on this below, p. 26 and note 13. 
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 Can Stoicism be practised in a way in which some people practise Christianity or 
Buddhism – not, to be sure, as a religion, but as a kind of “philosophy of life”? 
Undoubtedly. The attitudes and recommendations that Pigliucci is following may be 
called “stoical”. Moreover, the ancient Stoics considered philosophy as an “art of living”, 
not as an academic discipline, so that Stoicism can be considered as a system of views 
and attitudes that can be practised in everyday life. That is how it is understood by the 
“New Stoicism” that is promoted in the Stoic Week.  
Pigliucci does not mention the Stoic sage in his description, and the New Stoics 
do not put the figure of the sage in the center of their activities. However, as I said, the 
Stoics restricted happy life for one type of people only – the sages. Hence, one may 
plausibly ask whether what Pigliucci is promoting as his daily routine is really Stoicism. 
It can be acknowledged that the New Stoicism has elements of diluted Stoicism. But is it 
possible to speak of Stoicism in the proper sense of the term without taking into 
consideration the notion of the sage? This is the central question I will address in this 
Thesis. I will try to show why the notion of the sage is indispensable for understanding 
the Stoic philosophical system. 
 
1.2. A brief history of ancient Stoicism and sources 
The term “ancient Stoicism” refers to a movement which lasted for almost five centuries. 
It begins around 300 BCE, when Zeno of Citium started teaching in the Painted Stoa in 
Athens, and ends with the death of Marcus Aurelius, the last Roman Stoic, in 180 CE.  
The founder of the school Zeno attracted many followers who started to gather 
informally around the so-called stoa poikilê (the Painted Porch, situated on the north side 
of the ancient agora of Athens), which is how the Stoics got their name. History of 
Stoicism is divided into three stages: 1. Early Stoicism (main representatives are the 
founder of Stoicism Zeno of Citium, Aristo of Chios, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus, who is 
considered to be the greatest Stoic philosopher; as the saying goes, “if there had been no 
Chrysippus, there would have been no Stoa” (Diogenes Laertius 7.183)); 2. Middle 
Stoicism (Panaetius and Posidonius); and 3. Late or Roman Stoicism (Seneca, Musonius 
Rufus, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius). Unfortunately, the Stoic writings from the period of 
early and middle Stoicism have been lost, and we have to rely on fragments and reports 
of other, often unsympathetic authors. Stoic philosophy is known today mostly from the 
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perspective of the Roman Stoics, mainly from Epictetus and Seneca. The most important 
non-Stoic source is Cicero, who manifests good knowledge of Stoicism, with a critical 
perspective. In this Thesis, I will rely mostly on the Stoic sources gathered in the 
collection by A. Long and D. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers (abbreviated LS).  
 
 
1.3. Overview of the Thesis 
The Stoics describe the sage as the embodiment of wisdom; ignorant of nothing; the only 
one who has knowledge and expertise; the only one who is fully rational, virtuous and 
happy; and, finally, as a person who does not have emotions, but only eupatheiai, or 
“good feelings”. These are stunning claims, hard to believe. The purpose of this Thesis is 
to provide some explanation of them. I will consider them within the contexts in which 
they arise. 
The Stoics divide philosophy into logic, physics, and ethics (LS 26A-D). The 
statements that concern the sage’s knowledge fall within the field of logic, since this 
discipline, according to the Stoics, comprises, among other things, the doctrine of 
“yardsticks and criteria” (LS 31A), that is, epistemology. Hence, in Chapter 2 I will 
analyze some basic notions of Stoic epistemology – impression, assent, cognition, 
opinion, knowledge, etc. – in order to see what meaning can be given to the Stoic claims 
that only the sage has knowledge and expertise and that he is ignorant of nothing.  
The subject of chapters 3 and 4 is the role of the sage within the Stoic ethics. To 
show why the sage is the only one who is virtuous and happy, I will discuss the Stoic 
conception of virtue, their idea that all things besides virtue and vice are indifferent, and 
their claim that virtue is necessary and sufficient for happiness. I will also address some 
seemingly paradoxical features of the process of becoming a sage. In Chapter 4, I will 
discuss Stoic views on emotions (which are also part of the ethical division of their 
philosophy: Diogenes Laertius 7.84 = LS 56A) and their introduction of the so-called 
“good feelings”, which are appropriate for the sage. As for the physical part of Stoic 
philosophy, in Chapter 3, I will briefly discuss some ideas that lay behind the sage’s 
possession of virtue and rationality.  
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In Chapter 5, I will draw some conclusions. In my opinion, the concept of a sage 
is constructed out of the concepts of the entire Stoic philosophical system. It is a 
theoretical concept which is the consequence of their central philosophical tenets.  
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2. THE SAGE’S KNOWLEDGE 
 
2.1. Only the sage has knowledge  
The Stoics put forward three theses concerning the sage’s knowledge: they say that it is 
only the sage who has knowledge; that he is ignorant of nothing; and that only the sage 
is expert in various skills. In this Section, I will discuss the first of these theses, while the 
remaining two will be the subject of the next Section. 
To see what it could mean to say that it is only the sage who has knowledge, a 
brief account of Stoic epistemological notions is needed. The Stoics defined knowledge 
as a type of cognition (katalêpsis). Cognition is assent (sunkatathesis) to a specific type 
of impression (phantasia), the so-called cognitive impression (phantasia katalêptikê). 
Impression or presentation, as the Stoic word phantasia is often translated, is an 
impression of external things as they impinge on our mind. Our assent is our reaction, i.e. 
the acceptance or non-acceptance of the presented, which is under our control. For 
instance, it is presented to me or impressed upon me that there is a dog in front of me, 
and I assent to this presentation or impression, which amounts to my belief that there is a 
dog in front of me.  
Impression is the passive element of the cognition: at every moment, we are 
exposed to a multitude of impressions, and this is something that happens without our 
willing it. Assent, on the other hand, is the active element of the cognition, since we 
choose which impression we will assent to. Cognition is not assent to just any kind of 
impression, but to cognitive impression and it only. According to the classical Stoic 
definition (LS 40D, E), cognitive impression is an impression which  
(a) arises from that which is (i.e. from that which is real);  
(b) is stamped and impressed in accordance with that very thing; and  
(c) is of such a kind as could not arise from what is not (i.e. from what is not real).  
The incognitive impressions are all other impressions that do not satisfy these criteria (LS 
40C). 
The definition of cognitive impression was a subject of many disputes between 
the Stoics and their opponents, especially Academic Skeptics. That (a) cognitive 
impression arises from something real means, roughly, that it cannot be a product of a 
dream or hallucination. (b) means that a cognitive impression accurately represents the 
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thing from which it arises, e.g. impression of a horse accurately represents real existing 
horse. The condition (c) is the most controversial one. It seems that it has been introduced 
by Zeno as a response to a challenge made by the Skeptic Arcesilaus, which is concisely 
described in the following passage:  
[Speaker: Cicero on behalf of the New Academy] (i) We may take him 
[Arcesilaus] to have asked Zeno what would happen if the wise man could not 
cognize anything and it was the mark of the wise man not to opine. (2) Zeno, I 
imagine, replied that the wise man would not opine since there was something 
cognitive. (3) What then was this? Zeno, I suppose, said: an impression. (4) What 
kind of impression? Zeno then defined it as an impression stamped and 
reproduced from something which is, exactly as it is. (5) Arcesilaus next asked 
whether this was still valid if a true impression was just like a false one. (6) At 
this point Zeno was sharp enough to see that if an impression from what is were 
such that an impression from what is not could be just like it, there was no 
cognitive impression. (7) Arcesilaus agreed that it was right to add this to the 
definition, since neither a false impression nor a true one would be cognitive if 
the latter were just such as even a false one could be. (8) But he applied all his 
force to this point of the argument, in order to show that no impression arising 
from something true is such that an impression arising from something false could 
not also be just like it. (9) This is the one controversial issue which has lasted up 
to the present. (LS 40D) 
 
This dispute between Arcesilaus and Zeno can be mapped out like this: Arcesilaus asks 
Zeno: what if your sage cannot know anything since nothing is knowable and nothing can 
be a subject of knowledge? Then the sage could only hold opinions. However, if he 
opines, then he could be mistaken or have a false judgement, which is not a characteristic 
of a sage. Zeno replies (3) that the subject of knowledge is cognitive impression, which 
he defines as an impression stamped and reproduced from something which is, exactly as 
it is, reclaiming (a) and (b) part of classical Stoic definition of cognitive impression. 
Arcesilaus objects (5) that there may be a false impression which is qualitatively 
indiscernible from a true one. For instance, suppose that I have an impression that in front 
of me is Mary, and that that impression strikes me as an accurate representation of Mary, 
but that person whom I am looking at is actually her twin sister, who is unknown to me. 
Zeno replies ((8), which is part (c) of the definition) that cognitive impression is such that 
an impression arising from something false could not also be just like it. Cognitive 
impression cannot arise from something which is not. This means that for the impression 
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of Mary to be cognitive, the impression has to be such that it cannot arise from Mary’s 
sister. 
The dispute between the Stoics and the Skeptics did not come to an end by Zeno’s 
remark, but the details of further arguments need not interest us here. What is important 
is to note the role of the character of the sage. The character of the sage is introduced to 
stress that there is something stronger than opinion, i.e. cognition. The Stoics, however, 
do not reason as follows: if there were no cognition, there would not be a sage; since there 
is a sage, there is cognition. Rather, they are just insisting that since there is such a thing 
as cognition, the objection that the sage does not exist or that he is forced to opine should 
be rejected.  
Cognition is assent to cognitive impression. As opposed to cognition, opinions or 
beliefs (doxai) are defined by the Stoics as weak or false assents which do not capture 
impression truly and firmly enough (LS 41B, C); hence, they are assents to incognitive 
impression (LS 41G). Due to lack of firm grasp, opinion can be true or false. I can have 
an impression that Mary is in front of me but that impression can be vague and I can 
assent to it without certainty, which means that I have an opinion that Mary is in front of 
me, but I do not have a cognition of that fact.  
Besides cognition and opinion there is scientific knowledge (epistêmê), which 
only the sage has:  
(1) The Stoics say there are three things which are linked together, scientific 
knowledge, opinion and cognition stationed between them. (2) Scientific 
knowledge is cognition which is secure and firm and unchangeable by reason. (3) 
Opinion is weak and false assent. (4) Cognition in between these is assent 
belonging to a cognitive impression; and a cognitive impression, so they claim, is 
one which is true and of such a kind that it could not turn out false. (5) Of these 
they say that scientific knowledge is found only in the wise, and opinion only in 
the inferior, but cognition is common to them both, and it is the criterion of 
truth. (LS 41C) 
Both the sage and the inferiors (or fools: see next chapter) have cognition, but only the 
sage has knowledge, while inferiors or fools have opinion. Sage does not have opinions. 
The fact that the fools have cognition means that they also assent to cognitive 
impressions; however, their cognition is changeable, unsecure and weak, which is why 
they cannot have knowledge. Here we can notice an important distinction between Stoic 
and contemporary epistemology. In contemporary epistemology, knowledge is seen as a 
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kind of belief: belief is a necessary but not sufficient condition for knowledge. For Stoics, 
on the other hand, knowledge and belief are two incompatible states, just like sages and 
fools are two incompatible types of people. Since belief is weak assent, its main feature 
is fallibility; consequently, you cannot convert belief into knowledge by adding to it some 
further attribute, as in contemporary epistemology. This reasoning is similar to Plato’s in 
the Republic. Plato thinks that knowledge and opinion or belief differ in types of their 
objects: the objects of knowledge are unchangeable things such as Forms, while the 
objects of opinion are changeable things, i.e. material particulars. One cannot have 
knowledge of particular physical things because they change, while knowledge has to be 
permanent, unchangeable. Likewise, in Stoicism, fools cannot have knowledge because 
they can be mistaken. 
 Now the Stoic position may be summarized thus: to hold opinions is to be prone 
to error; hence, those who hold opinions are those who are prone to error; since the 
possession of knowledge precludes the possibility of being in error, it follows that 
knowledge can only be possessed by those who cannot hold opinions, i.e. of sages. 
 The above quotation makes it clear that one difference between knowledge and 
cognition is in firmness, not in the corresponding objects: cognition is not as firm as 
knowledge. This is well illustrated by Zeno (LS 41A): he displayed the open palm of a 
hand and said that impression is like this – we just receive impressions without our 
intervention. Then he clenched his fingers and said that this is assent; after that, he made 
a fist, which corresponds to cognition. And then he took his other hand to tightly and 
forcefully hold his fist and then he pointed that this represents the knowledge that only 
the sage has. 
However, firmness is not the only differing point between cognition and 
knowledge: 
Scientific knowledge [epistêmê] is [1] a cognition which is secure and 
unchangeable by reason. [2] It is secondly a system of such epistemai, like the 
rational cognition of particulars which exists in the virtuous man. [3] It [scientific 
knowledge here = science] is thirdly a system of expert epistemai, which has 
intrinsic stability, just as the virtues do. [4] Fourthly, it is a tenor for the reception 
of impressions which is unchangeable by reason, and consisting, they say, in 
tension and power. (LS 41 H) 
The Greek word epistêmê can mean both “knowledge”, as a mental state or disposition, 
and “science”, as a body of propositions. Scientific knowledge is a cognition which is 
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secure and unchangeable and as such it demands systematic character. Particular 
cognitions cannot be qualified as knowledge if they are not rationally connected ((2): 
“rational cognition of particulars which exists in the virtuous man”) or if they are not 
connected in systematic manner. Thus, the fools have only isolated cognitions, whereas 
knowledge consists of a network of cognitions, with explanatory relations among them. 
The network of cognitions has to be (3) stable or intrinsically firm just as the virtues are 
stable.  
Knowledge is, furthermore, (4) tenor for the reception of impression. “Tenor” 
(hexis) is important term in Stoic philosophy. It signifies “the pervading ‘breath’ which 
accounts for the unitary existence of natural substances” (Long and Sedley 1987: 289). It 
is not clear whether in the above quotation tenor is used in its general sense, as sustaining 
principle of all things, or in a narrower sense, of a “character” (diathesis) as a permanent 
disposition specific to human beings (Brouwer 2014: 31-32; see also Long and Sedley 
1987, 376, and pp. 19-20). Be that as it may, the stress is again on stability. Knowledge 
requires stable disposition to receive impressions, and such stability is available only to 
the sage.  
Why, then, the Stoics insist that only the sage has knowledge? It seems that this 
follows from the fact that they, like other ancient philosophers (notably Plato), maintain 
that to be called “knowledge”, a mental state has to meet very strict criteria: (a) it must 
be always true; and (b) it must be unchangeable and stable. Obviously, such mental state 
is not available to those who tend to assent to false impression or who tend to withdraw 
their assent, that is to say, to change their opinion. This is characteristic of ordinary human 
beings: we are all susceptible to error, and we all change our opinions when faced with 
convincing counterarguments. If knowledge requires such strong requirements, then only 
two options seem available: either knowledge does not exist or knowledge does exist but 
is reserved for the sages. Stoics have chosen the second way of dealing with this problem 
– knowledge exists and is a privilege of the sages. 
 
2.2. What does the sage know? 
Let me now turn to the second question, that of the content of the sage’s knowledge. What 
does the sage know? Some Stoic sources may seem to suggest that the sage is omniscient, 
since they say that the sage is “ignorant of nothing” (LS 41G; Kerferd 1978: 128; Brouwer 
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2014: 62). Now, if the sage is ignorant of nothing, does it mean that he knows every detail 
and event from the past, present, and future? This is a highly unlikely interpretation of 
the Stoic position, but not impossible. For, it is not clear whether any sage really existed, 
or whether he can be conceived of as a perfect ideal which was never instantiated. If he 
is just a perfect ideal, then nothing prevents to ascribe to him omniscience in a literal 
sense of the word. However, the Stoics have pointed out Socrates, Heracles and Odysseus 
as examples of sages (see Brouwer 2014: 164, and below, p. 25) The problem is that none 
of them can be considered to be omniscient in a literal sense nor even to have extended 
knowledge of different facts (see Kerferd 1978: 126-128). 
 The Stoics, however, do not say that the sage is literally omniscient. What they 
say is only that he is free of ignorance. Hence, the best way in which the attribute of all-
knowing should be interpreted is by considering ignorance as a disposition or mental state 
which cannot be attributed to the Stoic sage. 
The Stoic sage “never makes a false supposition” and “does not assent at all to 
anything non-cognitive, owing to his not opining and his being ignorant of nothing” (LS 
41G), which means that the sage cannot be in a disposition that manifests itself as a false 
supposition or to assent to something non-cognitive (see also LS 41B, C, D). This does 
not mean that the sage knows, or cannot be ignorant of, every piece of information that 
could be known. Rather, this means that the sage never gives a kind of assent 
characteristic of ignorance. For, ignorance is, according to the Stoics, changeable and 
weak assent, and the sage never assents to an impression in such a way (LS 41G). His 
assent is always firm, and always has only cognitive impression as its content. As opposed 
to this, the fool’s assent is weak (LS 41B, F). A fool can assent both to cognitive and 
incognitive impression. When he assents to a cognitive impression, this is not yet 
knowledge, as his assent is not firm. (One might even say that the fool’s assent to 
cognitive impression is a stroke of good luck.) When he assents to an incognitive 
impression, then he manifests his ignorance. 
 Hence, the sage is omniscient in the sense that he always assents to cognitive 
impression and that every cognitive impression that he assents to becomes a part of his 
entire system of knowledge. The sage will assent to something only if it is presented to 
him in the form of a cognitive impression. For instance, if there are exactly 25 people on 
the Jelačić Square right now, he will firmly assent to impression that there are 25 people 
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on the Jelačić Square right now only if it is presented to him as a cognitive impression, 
e.g. if he has counted all and only the people on the Jelačić Square (none of them left or 
came while he was counting, etc.). If it is not presented to him at all or it is not presented 
as a cognitive impression (if he could not clearly count the people on the Square), he will 
not assent to it, and, consequently, he will not know it (see on this Vogt 2008: 121). So, 
there is a sense in which we can call him ignorant of the fact that there were, in fact, 25 
people on the Square, but this is not the relevant sense. The relevant sense would be if he 
would have given assent to a false impression, i.e. if his mental state contained a false 
belief. He is not ignorant – in that sense – of the fact that there are 25 people on the 
Square. In fact, he is not ignorant – in that sense – of anything. What he has in mind is all 
and only true beliefs. It is in this sense that he “knows everything” – his mental attitude 
towards everything which is available to him through impressions is knowledge, as 
opposed to the fools, who have opinion and ignorance. 4 Both opinion and ignorance are 
defined as weak assent (LS 41B, C, G), and the difference between them is not always 
clear. As Long and Sedley (1987: 257) explain, “‘Ignorance’ accommodates all cognitive 
states ... which fall short of the impregnable stability and systematic consistency ... that 
belong to the wise man’s scientific knowledge. The absolute disjunction between 
scientific knowledge and ignorance is an important instance of the Stoics' ruthless 
insistence on excluding any mental disposition intermediate between excellence and its 
opposite.” 
Taken in this way, the phrase “ignorant of nothing” does not sound as lavish as it 
sounded before. “Ignorant of nothing” simply refers to mental state, not to the content of 
the sage’s knowledge. 
This kind of mental state, according to the Stoics, is reserved for kings, generals, 
rich, free, beautiful, consuls, praetors, emperors, seers, poets, priests, etc. That is to say, 
only the sages are true kings, generals, rich, free, beautiful, etc. (see Vogt, 2008: 118-119, 
who gives a list of passages). Cicero refers to such statements as to the Stoic paradoxes, 
along with statements like “virtue is the only good”, “virtue is sufficient for happiness”, 
“all the vices and all virtues are equal”, and “all fools are madmen” (and discusses them 
                                                
4 The same holds for the Sage’s doing everything well: “They [the Stoics] also say that the wise man does 
everything well – that is to say, everything that he does: for as we say that the flute-player or the lyre-player 
does everything well, with the implications ‘everything to do with flute-playing’, and ‘everything to do 
with lyre-playing’, so the prudent man does everything well, so far as concerns what he does, and not of 
course also what he does not do” (LS 61G, emphasis mine). 
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in his work Stoic Paradoxes). It is clear why the idea that only the sages are true kings, 
generals, etc. seems paradoxical. It combines two things discussed thus far. First, it 
reemphasizes the thesis that only the sages have knowledge. Second, it gives an object-
based interpretation of the sage’s “omniscience”: take any field of expertise, the Stoics 
will claim that only the sage can be an expert in this field. This, of course, does not seem 
possible. For, to be a good poet, king, general, etc., the sage will have to collect an 
enormous amount of information, which is impossible to accomplish within a single 
lifetime.  
Stoic idea that only the sage is king, general, etc. suggests one more thing. Julia 
Annas points out that there are two conceptions of the sage in ancient philosophy. 
According to the first, the sage is a person living according to an ideal which transcends 
the everyday, rising above it and regarding ordinary life, its concerns and troubles, as 
petty and fleeting (Annas 2008: 14). This conception was implied in Plato’s Theaetetus 
where Plato talks about those who escape from earth to heaven, becoming like god as 
much as possible (176a-b). According to the second conception, the sage is somebody 
who does not rise above everyday life but stays at the ordinary level of life. The concept 
that should be preferred when interpreting the Stoic sage is the second one, since he is 
said to be such that he can get married, have family, do politics and earn money.5  
 What does it mean, then, to say that only the sage is, for instance, a general? As 
above, this has nothing to do with the content of the sage’s knowledge: the Stoics do not 
want to say that only the sage knows the facts that are necessary for being a general. Of 
course, they cannot deny that someone’s being a general is a matter of his having mastered 
a vast amount of information from various domains. But this is not all that is needed for 
someone’s being a general. Generalship is a skill, which means that general is the person 
who is able to exercise his knowledge in the right, i.e. skillful, way. What that means is 
that only the Stoic sage has a virtue, which is a disposition to act for the right reason. 
Only the sage can act for the right reason, since he is the only one who has knowledge 
and skill to use his knowledge in the right or virtuous way (LS 61G, 63C). Since the sage 
is the only one capable of acting for the right reason, he will be able to perform virtuously 
in any domain of life, not just in specific domain as generalship. When knowledge is 
                                                
5 Chrysippus mentions three ways in which the sage could make money – by being a king or king’s advisor, 
from friends and from lectures (LS 67F). 
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exercised virtuously or for the right reason, then skill is mastered to the perfection. Since 
only the sage can use knowledge in a perfectly skillful way, only the sage can be a general. 
Dio Chrysostom, discussed by Annas (2008: 20-21), offers an example: a sage may not 
be a better farmer then the professional farmer if we look at it from a common point of 
view, since a sage is cut off from information relevant for farmership. But on the other 
hand, the sage is in some way superior to an ordinary farmer “in his acting, or not, 
advantageously, and in recognizing when and where to act, and in recognizing the right 
moment (better even than the craftsman) and what is possible” (quoted by Annas 2008: 
21). Everything that he does, the sage does in accordance with right reason: he knows 
when, how, where, etc. he should exercise his knowledge, he knows his priorities, he 
knows when not to act, etc., and all this because he has virtue as a disposition to act for 
the right reason.  
 Let me finally say a few words about what does the sage’s wisdom consist of. 
According to LS 26A, 
The Stoics said that wisdom is scientific knowledge of the divine and the human, 
and that philosophy is the practice of expertise in utility. Virtue singly and at its 
highest is utility, and virtues, at their most generic, are triple—the physical one, 
the ethical one, and the logical one. For this reason, philosophy also has three 
parts—physics, ethics and logic. 
Wisdom is described as scientific knowledge of the divine and the human, which can be 
interpreted as meaning that wisdom is scientific knowledge of everything, since human 
and divine, for the Stoics, captures the whole universe. For, politics, morality, art, etc. are 
considered to be parts of human affairs, while nature is by itself divine. Hence, if wisdom 
is scientific knowledge of the divine and the human, and if the divine and the human is 
everything, then he who has that type of knowledge or wisdom can be called the sage. 
 Etymologically, philosophy is a pursuit of wisdom; hence, philosophy is a pursuit 
of scientific knowledge of the divine and the human. However, in the above quotation 
philosophy is described as a practice of expertise in utility. There are three virtues or types 
of virtues – the physical one, the ethical one, and the logical one – and this is why 
philosophy has exactly three parts. Virtues are excellences in mastering whatever it is that 
is being mastered: for instance, excellent shoemaker is a person who is good at making 
shoes, i.e. who has mastered the art of making shoes to a highest degree. Thus, virtues 
mentioned in the above quotation can be described as excellences that one achieves when 
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dealing with moral, physical and logical problems. In other words, he who has virtue or 
excellence is good in ethics, physics and logic. He who has virtue is good in everything. 
He who has virtue knows ethics, physics and logic. He who has virtue and knows 
everything is a sage. But is that all it takes to be a sage?  
It takes a bit more to be called a sage. There are at least two further conditions 
that must be met as far as the sage’s knowledge is concerned. First, the sage must have a 
unified knowledge of ethics, physics and logic, since these three disciplines are 
inseparable from each other. The sage cannot have knowledge of logic without having 
the knowledge of ethics, nor knowledge of ethics without having knowledge of physics.6 
The second condition is proposed by Seneca and it entails that the sage must possess the 
knowledge of the causes:  
Wisdom is the human mind's good brought to perfection. Philosophy is the love 
and pursuit of wisdom; it strives for the goal which wisdom has achieved ... Some 
have so defined wisdom that they call it scientific knowledge of the divine and 
the human. Others have defined it thus: wisdom is knowledge of the divine and 
the human and their causes. (Seneca, Letter 89.4 = LS 26G, emphasis mine) 
This new element expands the definition of wisdom: in addition to the idea that the goal 
of human life or the good of the human mind consists of having knowledge of the divine 
and the human, one must also know their causes. This modification is very important for 
overall understanding of the concept of sagehood. However, it is not clear what exactly 
Seneca has in mind here. Does he want to assert that for every divine and human event, 
sage can state its cause? He explains in letter 88 (= LS 26F) that the sage “both studies 
and knows the causes of the natural objects whose numbers and measures the geometer 
researches and computes”. Sage does not know every detail of just any event. Rather, 
every divine and human event that he has knowledge of has a cause, and the sage knows 
that cause. What sage knows he knows in such a way that he knows its cause. For 
example, a sage would know why it is raining or why the Sun rises on the east and sets 
on the west or why the virtues are the only good of the human mind. 
 
                                                
6 The Stoics strongly insist on the unity and inseparability between the three parts of philosophy. Posidonius 
compares philosophy to a living being – “physics to the blood and flesh, logic to the bones and sinews, and 
ethics to the soul” (LS 26D) – thus stressing the strict unity of philosophy. 
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I have discussed three Stoic statements concerning the sage’s knowledge: that it is only 
the sage who has knowledge, that he is ignorant of nothing, and that only the sage is 
expert in various skills. These characteristics are not supernatural capabilities nor are they 
ideals which people should strive to achieve. Rather, they are mere consequences from 
the criteria that are necessary for achieving knowledge and skill. If knowledge entails 
intrinsic stability and firmness, if knowledge exists (assuming that we want to avoid 
skeptical conclusions), and if ordinary people do not meet the criteria of stability and 
firmness, then it follows that knowledge is in possession only of the wise. Moreover, if 
skill includes the exercise of knowledge for the right reason and in the right way, then 
only the sage can possess skill, for only he can act for the right reason and in the right 
way.   
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3. THE SAGE’S VIRTUE AND HAPPINESS 
 
3.1. Virtues, vices, and indifferents 
The Stoics follow Socrates in maintaining that virtue is a necessary and sufficient 
condition for happiness. Virtue is the only constituent of happiness. It demands 
knowledge, firmness, persistence and right mental attitude towards indifferent things. The 
class of indifferents consists of all things that are not virtue or vice (health, life, wealth, 
etc.). Common people or fools do not have the characteristics requisite for possessing 
virtues; quite the contrary, they strive for indifferents as for something good.  
 As stated previously, virtue is a disposition to act for the right reason, and by 
acting for the right reason the sage exercises his virtue. Having a virtue is not narrowed 
down to having a right reason in a certain domain, but it expands to having an expertise 
concerned with the whole of life. It has been shown above (2.2) that the whole of life 
comprises the ethical, physical and logical domain, and there are correspondingly three 
main parts of virtue. Consequently, the sage is good or virtuous with respect to the whole 
of life. The sage is the only one who has a virtue and the virtue is the only good. The only 
bad thing is vice, and the one who is lacking virtue is vicious or bad, just like all his 
actions. It is perhaps misleading to translate the Greek words aretê and kakia as “virtue” 
and “vice” respectively, since this may suggest that their meaning is restricted to the 
moral domain. Rather, they refer to excellences and defects with respect to the whole of 
life, and indeed to inanimate objects, e.g. the Greeks would say that the excellence of a 
knife is sharpness.   
To say that virtue is a disposition to act for the right reason is not sufficiently 
informative as a definition of virtue. Diogenes Laertius (LS 61A) says that virtue is 
“consistent character, choiceworthy for its own sake and not from fear or hope or anything 
external”. Thus Diogenes only emphasizes the firmness and persistence of virtue. 
Plutarch (LS 61B) is more informative. He says that virtue is  
a certain character and power of the soul’s commanding-faculty, engendered by 
reason, or rather, a character which is itself consistent, firm and unchangeable 
reason.  
Thus, virtue is, first, described as “character” (diathesis). The difference between 
character and another kind of state, “tenor” (hexis), which I have already mentioned (p. 
   
   
20 
 
12), is in the fact that character does not admit of degrees (cannot be relaxed or intensified, 
see LS 47S; another example of character is straightness of a stick). This is why virtue is 
a state of moral perfection, which cannot have degrees. Furthermore, virtue is the power 
of the soul’s commanding-faculty. The commanding-faculty of the soul is the seat of all 
mental states, and is identified with breath (LS 53G). Thus, virtue is not just a specific 
mental state, but a physical state as well.  
 Plutarch also says that virtue is “unchangeable reason”, which means that it is 
entirely rational quality, while vice is irrational deflection from rationality. Stoic 
psychology is monistic: they insist that the soul is rational throughout, and the irrationality 
of the vice is just the aberration from it. 7  Finally, virtue is, as Diogenes says, 
“choiceworthy for its own sake”, which means that it is sufficient for happiness. 
Happiness completely consists of virtue, and just as happiness is the ultimate goal that is 
choiceworthy because of itself, virtue is also choiceworthy because of itself.  
A further feature of virtue is that it is the only thing that benefits (LS 58A, 60G). 
It may seem odd to say that only virtue benefits and that other things such as money, 
health and beauty are not beneficial. There are two things that the Stoics may have in 
mind when they say that virtue is the only beneficial thing. First, they are basically saying 
that virtue is the only thing that is always and without exception useful for happiness, 
given that it is the sole constituent of happiness. All other things are beneficial or 
detrimental for happiness relative to virtue and vice. This does not make all other things 
bad or vicious, it just makes them indifferent.  
As I have said, all other things that are not virtues or vices are indifferents. Not 
all indifferents have the same status, however. Some indifferent things are in accordance 
with nature because they promote person’s natural state, and this gives them value and 
reason to be preferred. Such things are life, health, beauty, strength, and the like. Other 
indifferents are in contrast with nature because they do not promote person’s natural state, 
and this is why they are dispreferred. Such things are sickness, death, weakness, ugliness, 
and the like.8 It is wrong to think of preferred indifferents as something good and of 
                                                
7 See LS 61B: “They suppose that the passionate and irrational part is not distinguished from the rational 
by any distinction within the soul’s nature, but the same part of the soul (which they call thought and 
commanding-faculty) becomes virtue and vice as it wholly turns around and changes in passions and 
alterations of tenor or character, and contains nothing irrational within itself.” 
8 See LS 58A-E. An exception from Stoic orthodoxy in this question is Aristo, who rejected all distinctions 
within the class of indifferents. See LS 58F and G. 
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dispreffered indifferents as something bad. Preferred indifferents are not good things, 
since they do not always benefit; dispreferred indifferents are not bad things, since they 
do not always harm. This is the second thing the Stoics may have in mind when insisting 
that virtue is the only thing that benefits: it is the only thing that is always beneficial. 
Preferred indifferents may be beneficial, but none of them is always such, as there may 
be situations in which they can be harmful and do not count as benefits.9  
Yet, preferred indifferents are things that should be selected because this is in 
accordance with human nature. Chrysippus explains: 
As long as the future is uncertain to me I always hold to those things which are 
better adapted to obtaining the things in accordance with nature; for god himself 
has made me disposed to select these. But if I actually knew that I was fated now 
to be ill, I would even have an impulse to be ill. For my foot too, if it had 
intelligence, would have an impulse to get muddy. (LS 58J) 
 
Chrysippus is naturally disposed to select health and he will continue to do so in the future 
since he is not a sage and does not have knowledge of the future. If he were a sage, things 
would have been substantially different. In that case Chrysippus would be differently 
disposed or constituted. He would be familiar with his fate and according to it he might 
have an impulse to be ill. For, if he knew that he would be ill, the sage would comply 
with this, and follow what is inevitable. The foot example is meant to stress the radical 
difference between the sage and the fools. If Chrysippus were a sage, he might have an 
impulse to be ill. Likewise, if his foot were intelligent, it might have an impulse to be 
muddy. The difference between the wise Chrysippus and the foolish Chrysippus is 
analogous to the difference between a regular foot and an intelligent foot. The difference 
between the sage and common people is just as enormous as the difference between an 
intelligent foot and a regular foot. This should be borne in mind when reading that the 
sage could choose some dispreferred indifferent, say, commit a suicide.10 The difference 
                                                
9 Such is for instance health: “For if healthy man had to serve a tyrant and be destroyed for this reason, 
while the sick had to be released from the service and, therewith also, from destruction, the wise man would 
rather choose sickness in this circumstance than death” (LS 58F). 
10 “When a man has a preponderance of the things in accordance with nature, it is his proper function to 
remain alive; when he has or foresees a preponderance of their opposites, it is his proper function to depart 
from life. This clearly shows that it is sometimes a proper function both for the wise man to depart from 
life, although he is happy, and for a fool to remain alive, although he is wretched” (LS 66G). Diogenes 
Laertius (7.130 = LS 66H) says that the Stoic sage can commit suicide for patriotic reasons, on behalf of 
his friends, if he suffers severe pain, because of mutilation, and because of incurable illness. It does not 
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between the sage and common people is the perfect depiction of the action that the Stoic 
sage would do in the case of suicide – in which he would consciously choose dispreferred 
indifferent due to his knowledge of large portion of circumstances that would lead him 
towards such an act.  
Actions by which we select preferred indifferents the Stoics call “appropriate 
actions” or “proper functions”. Chrysippus is naturally disposed to select health and his 
action is appropriate. However, the sage will also select health and he will act in 
accordance with this proper function. Just like the foolish Chrysippus, the sage will feed 
himself, visit the doctor, exercise, etc. His action of choosing indifferents is called 
“completely correct” or “perfect appropriate action”. The difference between 
“appropriate action” and “perfect appropriate action” is clearly shown in Cicero’s 
example (LS 59F):  
For instance, if it is a right action to return a deposit in the just manner, to return 
a deposit should be counted as proper function. It becomes a right action by the 
addition, ‘in the just manner’, but the act of return just by itself is counted a proper 
function.  
The sage would not just return the deposit: he would return it “in the just manner” or in 
accordance with his virtue and for a right reason, and in the right time and circumstances. 
This is not the only difference between the fools’ and the sages’ attitude towards 
indifferents. As opposed to the fools, the sages will not strive for a preferred indifferent 
– say, health – as for something good. They will accept health as what it is – just a 
preferred indifferent. Yet, there will be no difference in external appearance of sages’ and 
fools’ actions. The difference comes down to different mental and physical state, mental 
firmness, unchangeable character and having the right reasons for performing an act. 
 
3.2. The attainment of happiness and virtue 
The biggest difference between sages and fools is seen in the final goal of life, which only 
a sage can achieve. The final good is happiness (eudaimonia) and only the sage’s life is 
assumed to be a happy one. Cicero gives clear and vivid description of why the sage is 
the only one who can have a sight of a final good: 
                                                
mean that the sage who opts for suicide would consider these things bad; he would only treat death as 
something indifferent (see Brennan, 2005: 39-42). Among Stoic philosophers, Seneca is famous for 
committing suicide in 65 CE.  
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It is a peculiar characteristic of the wise man that he does nothing which he could 
regret, nothing against his will, but does everything honourably, consistently, 
seriously, and rightly; that he anticipates nothing as if it were bound to happen, is 
shocked by nothing when it does happen under the impression that its happening 
is unexpected and strange, refers everything to his own judgement, stands by his 
own decisions. I can conceive nothing which is happier than this. It is an easy 
conclusion for the Stoics, since they have perceived the final good to be agreement 
with the nature and living consistently with the nature, which is not only the wise 
man’s proper function, but also his power. It necessarily follows that the happy 
life is in the power of the man who has the final good in his power. So, the wise 
man’s life is always happy. (Tusculan Disputations 5.81-82 = LS 63M) 
Cicero’s description of the sage is based on a list of traditional characteristics that need 
to be satisfied in order to call someone wise and therefore happy. His notion is in 
accordance with the Stoic notion of wisdom and happiness. He says that the Stoics define 
happiness as agreement with nature and living consistently with nature. However, this is 
not the only Stoic definition of happiness. Sources (LS 63A and B) mention that there 
was a dispute among the Stoics about how to understand happiness. Zeno defined it as 
“living in agreement”; Cleanthes defined it as “living in agreement with nature”; and 
Chrysippus defined it as “living in accordance with experience of what happens by 
nature”. The relationship between these three definitions is not entirely clear. Moreover, 
it is not clear whether “nature” refers to individual nature or nature as a whole. Elsewhere 
(On Ends 3.31 = LS 64A) Cicero takes “life in agreement with nature and living 
consistently with nature” as “life in which one applies knowledge of those things that 
happen by nature, selecting those in accordance with nature and rejecting those contrary 
to nature”. Thus, the sage selects things in accordance with nature, and these things, as 
mentioned earlier, are considered to be preferred indifferents. Happiness consists in his 
consistent and rational (LS 64C) selecting these things, and not in their achieving.  
 According to the Stoics, philosophy is an art of living, and its primary goal is a 
transformation of human life necessary for the attainment of happiness. Since only the 
sage can be considered happy, one might expect that the primary goal of human life is 
becoming a sage, or at least as similar to a sage as possible. Indeed, the Stoics speak of 
those who make progress towards virtue and happiness. Yet progressors do not make the 
third class of people – they should be classified among fools, as is clear from the following 
passage: 
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[J]ust as in the sea the man an arm’s length from the surface is drowning no less 
than the one who has sunk five hundred fathoms, so even those who are getting 
close to virtue are no less in a state of vice than those who are far from it. And just 
as the blind are blind even if they are going to recover their sight a little later, so 
those progressing remain foolish and vicious right up to their attainment of virtue. 
(LS 61T)  
This passage makes it clear, first, that progressors do not make the third class of people, 
since they either “remain foolish” or at one point attain virtue, i.e. become sages. Second, 
it makes it clear that there is no such thing as a process of becoming a sage, but that one’s 
transformation into a sage must be instantaneous. Just as you are drowning regardless of 
how far you are removed from the surface, so you are a fool regardless of how far you 
have progressed along the path towards virtue; and just as you will emerge from water 
instantaneously, so you will become virtuous instantaneously.11 A striking example of 
mockery of such a description is found in Plutarch’s Synopsis of the Treatise “The Stoics 
Talk More Paradoxically that the Poets”: 
Among the Stoics the man who is most vicious in the morning, if so it happens to 
be, is virtuous in the afternoon, and having fallen asleep unstable, ignorant, unjust 
and licentious, and even, by Zeus, a slave, poor and without means, he gets up the 
very same day, having become a king, rich and blessed as well as moderate, just, 
stable and holding no opinions, not having grown a beard yet or pubic hair in a 
body young and soft, but having got, in a soul that was feeble and soft and 
unmanly and not stable, perfect insight, the highest practical wisdom, a character 
equal to the gods, unopining knowledge and an unshakeable tenor, and this not by 
any previous diminution of depravity, but instantaneously, one could almost say, 
by having become from the most vicious of wild beasts some hero or daimon or 
god. For, if one has received virtue from the Stoa, it is possible to say: “Ask, if 
there’s anything you wish, all will be yours.” It brings wealth, it comprises 
kingship, it gives luck, it makes men prosperous and free from all other wants as 
well as self-sufficient, though they have not a single drachma of their own. (Ch. 
4, quoted by Brouwer 2014: 55) 
 Stoic ideas on sagehood now seem even more extravagant and paradoxical than 
before. What sense does it make to aspire to become virtuous and happy if it is a matter 
of instantaneous transformation? For, even you have made maximum progress, you are 
still unhappy and ignorant of your distance from the goal. What is worse, Plutarch also 
says (LS 61U) that it is even possible that you achieve virtue and happiness without 
noticing them. Furthermore, what motivation one might have in becoming wise if this 
                                                
11 One might object that it is just a part of you that first emerges from water, so that you do not emerge 
instantaneously, but the Stoics can reply that the part of you that emerges can be identified with you. 
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goal seems unattainable? For, as Cicero says, “it happens more often that a mule begets 
than that a sage comes into existence” (On Divination 2.61, quoted by Brouwer, 2014: 
102). Some ancient sources mention Socrates, Odysseus and Heracles as examples of 
Stoic sages (see Brouwer, 2014: 164). However, while they might be called sages 
according to some criteria, they certainly do not meet all the Stoic criteria for sagehood. 
Finally, it seems that the Stoics did not consider themselves as wise, but as inferiors like 
the rest of us.12 
 
3.3. The status of the sage 
There are at least three difficulties concerning the role of the sage within the Stoic ethical 
theory: (1) the very idea that only the sage is virtuous and happy seems extravagant, just 
as extravagant as (2) the idea that the transformation into a sage is instantaneous; and (3) 
since Stoic sages have never existed, what is the point in trying to reach sagehood? 
 These difficulties arise if the notion of the sage is approached by imagining a 
person who is happy, virtuous, all-knowing, etc., and then trying to understand its 
ontological status. Then the sage is imagined either as a paradigm who once existed in 
flesh and blood (or who may exist), or as an ideal which serves as a motivation to become 
happy and virtuous (but who cannot be instantiated). However, the problem can be 
approached from another angle.  
The Stoics try to give an explanation of some central philosophical notions, like 
knowledge, virtue, happiness, etc., and aim to show that they require very high standards. 
Take for instance virtues. Virtues are positive qualities, or properties on the basis of which 
someone (or something) may be called good. According to the Stoics, however, virtues 
include much more: for something to be called a virtue, it must always benefit, it must be 
a sole constituent of happiness, it must be completely rational and stable disposition to 
act for the right reasons. What is more, since virtue is disposition of the soul, and the soul 
is, according to the Stoics, material, having a virtue entails having a particular physical 
                                                
12 An extensive discussion of the sources is found in Brouwer 2014: 114-135. Sources mention several 
Stoic philosophers as candidates for the status of the sage: Sphaerus, Persaeus, Zeno, Cleanthes and Aristo. 
Brouwer shows that none of them considered himself a sage nor was treated as such within the school. In 
Roman period, a typical example of the Stoic sage was Cato the Younger, Caesar’s political opponent, who 
is famous for his committing the suicide in order not to be captured by Caesar (see Sellars 2006: 39-40). 
However, he also does not meet the original Stoic criteria for sagehood. 
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constitution. Finally, the Stoics insist that the four cardinal virtues – wisdom, courage, 
moderation, and justice – are inseparable from each other. 13  These are very strict 
requirements indeed, and the Stoics’ main task is to demonstrate that they are necessary.  
Now, virtue is a property, and properties have their bearers or possessors, so the 
question now arises: who is the possessor of virtue thus conceived? Since ordinary human 
beings cannot live up to the standards prescribed by the Stoics, and since the Stoics want 
to avoid skepticism about virtue (i.e. the conclusion that there is no such thing as virtue), 
they are compelled to postulate a possessor of virtue. Likewise with other properties 
(knowledge, happiness, true emotions, etc.) – it is necessary to postulate a model 
possessor for each of them.  
 So, the existence of the sage cannot be the motivation for striving towards virtue 
and happiness. The sage is just a theoretical construct from the attributes that are the 
cornerstone of Stoic philosophy. As for the difficulty with instantaneous transformation 
into sage, note that the simile with drowning I quoted earlier (LS 61T) is not about 
becoming a sage, but about the radical difference between sages and fools, and Plutarch’s 
passage is an obvious mockery.14 The Stoic idea is presumably that even though the 
process of moral education is long and arduous, the transformation into the sage occurs 
at once. In any case, it should not be assumed that becoming a sage is the goal of human 
history and development, at least not primarily or as a driving motivation. 
  
                                                
13 The Stoic views on the relationship between particular virtues are rather complicated. According to 
Aristo, virtue is “essentially one thing” (LS 61B); all particular virtues are just dispositions of a single virtue 
(LS 61C). Zeno is sometimes reported as following him in insisting on the identity of allegedly various 
virtues (LS 61B). On the other hand, however, Plutarch (LS 61C) says that “Zeno admits several virtues ... 
on the grounds that although inseparable they are distinct and different from each other”. According to 
Chrysippus, particular virtues are just different types of scientific knowledge (epistêmê) (LS 61H; see Long 
and Sedley 1987: 383-384). 
14 Plutarch’s passage is extensively discussed in Brouwer, 2014: 55-91. See also LS 61S and U. 
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4. GOOD FEELINGS 
 
The standard picture of a Stoic sage is of someone who either has no emotions at all or 
has suppressed them so they do not interfere with his reasoning and acting. As mentioned 
in the Introduction, The Oxford English Dictionary defines “Stoic” as “one who practices 
repression of emotions, indifference to pleasure or pain, and patient endurance”. Since he 
knows that virtue is the only good, the sage can lead a tranquil life, patiently enduring 
any kind of suffering. This characterization of a Stoic sage made him an iconic figure of 
popular culture. However, this appealing to the emotional status of a Stoic sage is based 
on a distorted interpretation of Stoic philosophy. 
Stoics do not claim that the sage is completely without emotions. Indeed, he does 
not have passions, affections (pathê) or emotions in a strict sense, but he has eupatheiai 
or “good feelings”, or good and acceptable ways of feeling and being affected (see Cooper 
2005: 176). In this chapter I will discuss emotions that the sage lacks, the reasons why he 
lacks them, and what are these good feelings. 
 
4.1. Emotions of the fools 
Stoic definition of emotions has two aspects. First, they say that emotions are irrational 
and contrary to nature (LS 65A; Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 4.10). Since they are 
contrary to the standards of rationality and nature, they should be avoided. Stobaeus (LS 
65A) explains in what sense emotions are irrational and unnatural. They are irrational in 
the sense of being “disobedient to reason”, e.g. when someone rationally thinks through 
some problem and then decides to act differently and opposite to reason due to intensity 
of some emotion. Emotions are contrary to nature because they are contrary to the 
principle of reason: they turn us aside from reason in a special way. When I entertain a 
false belief, I can easily abandon it when faced with evidence to the contrary. But this is 
not so with emotions: even when I get a belief that some emotion is not appropriate or 
expedient to have, it tends to persist in me.  
The second aspect of emotions according to the Stoics is somewhat more 
complicated. Namely, the Stoics consider emotions to be some kind of judgment or belief. 
The early Stoics did not agree upon the precise relationship between emotions and beliefs. 
It seems that Chrysippus thought that emotions are straightforwardly a kind of belief, 
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whereas Zeno more cautiously claimed that emotions are consequences or products of 
beliefs. The difference between their positions can be seen on the example of the Stoic 
definition of distress (or pain, lupê). According to one source (Andronicus, LS 65B), 
distress is fresh belief that something bad is present (this represents Chrysippus’ position), 
while according to another (Stobaeus, cited by Knuuttila 2004: 54), distress is caused by 
the belief that some fresh bad thing is present (this represents Zeno’s position). The latter 
definition may seem better (see Sellars 2006: 115). For, if I now believe that some bad 
thing is present, and if, as a result, I feel distressed, then perhaps tomorrow I will not feel 
distressed even though I may retain the belief that some bad thing was present. If emotions 
are simply identified with beliefs, then the loss of emotion would entail the loss of the 
pertinent belief, which does not seem necessary.  
Either way, the claim that emotions are judgements or beliefs, or their 
consequences, makes one of the most important and original features of Stoic philosophy. 
The idea behind this claim is relatively simple. It is based on the notions of impression 
and of assent to impression. We are involuntarily exposed to impressions, but when we 
voluntarily assent to them, we make a judgment, or hold a belief, that a certain state of 
affairs obtains. In the case of emotions, we not only assent to an impression; we add an 
evaluative component, for instance that certain state of affairs is something bad. If we 
assent to such evaluatively colored impression, we make an emotional reaction. In other 
words, emotions, as beliefs, are assents to evaluatively colored impressions. 
It should be clear why having emotions is a feature of the fools. Namely, emotions 
of the fools are necessarily false beliefs. They are false beliefs because nothing is good 
or bad besides virtue and vice. Hence, when I assent to an impression that some bad thing 
is present, and the thing in question is not vice, then I necessarily form a false belief, 
which is a characteristic of the fools. However, as I will show, assent to an evaluatively 
colored impression is not necessarily false, because impressions can be of things that 
really are good or bad. This is the source of the idea that there are emotions appropriate 
for the sage. 
Before addressing the problem of sage’s feelings, Stoic classification of emotions 
should be briefly examined. It is very well discussed in the sources, but perhaps it is best 
to rely on Cicero’s account in his Tusculan Disputations Book 3, since it is 
comprehensive, systematic and incorporates the good feelings of the sage. Cicero divides 
   
   
29 
 
emotions according to two criteria: whether they include beliefs of good or bad things 
and whether the good and the bad things are given in the present or expected to happen 
in the future. Thus, delight (or pleasure, hedonê) is belief concerning a present good, i.e. 
it is the belief that something good is now present, whereas it is not in fact good, since 
only virtue is good; desire (orexis) is belief concerning a future good, i.e. it is the belief 
that something good will be present in the future, whereas it is not in fact good; distress 
(or pain, hêdonê) is belief concerning a present evil, i.e. it is the belief that something bad 
is now present, whereas it is not in fact bad, since only vice is bad; fear (phobê) is belief 
concerning a future evil, i.e. it is the belief that something bad will be present in the future, 
whereas it is not in fact bad. Further classification includes numerous subspecies of these 
four basic emotions. Thus, under delight come spite, enchantment, vainglory, etc.; under 
desire come anger, heatedness, hatred, rancor, yearning, etc.; under distress are classified 
envying, rivalry, jealousy, pity, anxiety, grief, sorry, worry, mourning, etc.; under fear 
come indolence, shame, terror, panic, etc. (Tusculan Disputations 4.16-21). 
 
4.2. Volition, joy, and caution 
The same criteria used in the classification of common emotions are used in the 
classifications of the good feelings of the sage. As a result, there is a “good” counterpart 
for every common emotion, except for the emotion which is based on belief concerning 
a present evil, i.e. distress.15 Here is Cicero’s explanation: 
By nature, all people pursue those things which they think to be good and avoid 
their opposites. Therefore, as soon as a person receives an impression of some 
thing which he thinks is good, nature itself urges him to reach out after it. When 
this is done prudently and in accordance with consistency, it is the sort of reaching 
which the Stoics call a boulesis, and which I shall term a “volition.” They think 
that a volition, which they define as “a wish for some object in accordance with 
reason,” is found only in the wise person. But the sort of reaching which is aroused 
too vigorously and in a manner opposed to reason is called “desire” or “unbridled 
longing,” and this is what is found in all who are foolish. Similarly, there are two 
ways we may be moved as by the presence of something good. When the mind is 
moved quietly and consistently, in accordance with reason, this is termed “joy”; 
but when it pours forth with a hollow sort of uplift, that is called “wild or excessive 
gladness,” which they define as “an unreasoning elevation of mind.” And just as 
it is by nature that we reach out after the good, so also it is by nature that we 
                                                
15  Interestingly, Cicero translates the term eupatheia (“good emotion”) as constantia (“consistency”). 
Constantia is Latin equivalent for Greek homologia, which in Stoicism refers to the agreement with nature 
and right reason that are characteristic of happiness. In the quotation that follows this word is used in both 
senses. More on this see in Graver 2002: 136. 
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withdraw from the bad. A withdrawing which is in accordance with reason is 
termed “caution,” and this, as they understand it, is found only in the wise person; 
while the name “fear” is applied to a withdrawing that is apart from reason and 
that involves a lowly and effeminate swooning. Thus, fear is caution that has 
turned away from reason. For present evil the wise person has no affective 
response, but the foolish person responds with distress. For those who do not obey 
reason lower and contract their minds in circumstances which they believe to be 
evil. Hence the first definition for distress is this: “a contraction of mind contrary 
to reason.” Thus, there are four emotions, but three consistencies, since there is 
no consistency which corresponds to distress. (Tusculan Disputations 4.12-14, 
transl. by Graver 2002) 
 
Thus, volition (or wish, boulêsis) is a good feeling concerning a future true good, 
whose counterpart in fools is desire. Joy (chara) is a good feeling concerning a present 
true good, whose counterpart in fools is delight. Finally, caution (eulabeia) is a good 
feeling concerning a future true evil, whose counterpart in fools is fear. As with common 
emotions, good feelings can be further classified. Thus, volition includes kindness, 
generosity, warmth, and affection. Joy includes gratification, sociability, and 
cheerfulness, while caution includes respect and cleanliness (LS 65F). 
The impressions to which the sage gives his assent are all true. Hence, even when 
he assents to evaluatively colored impressions, those which concern something good or 
bad, he assents to true impressions. This is because they are impressions of really existing 
good or bad things – virtues and vices – as opposed to the fools’ impressions, which 
falsely represent something other than virtue or vice as good or bad. However, the sage’s 
assent to true evaluative impressions is not belief or opinion, but a piece of knowledge, 
since his assents are firm and consistent. Thus, when a sage assents to an impression that 
something good is present, he feels joy. The present good is, of course, virtue, either his 
own or of his fellow sage.16 Hence, he can feel joy either towards himself or towards 
someone else. If he feels caution, this means that he assents to the impression that some 
evil is impending. For instance, he is cautious about the possibility that he or some other 
sage might lose his virtue. Finally, volition concerns his expectation that he will possess 
virtue in the future as well. All these emotions he will feel according to reason, quietly 
                                                
16 As stressed by Cooper (2005: 208), one of the differences between ordinary emotions and good feelings 
of the sage is in the fact that the sages “are just as joyous over the virtue and virtuous actions of anyone 
else as they are over their own”, while emotional reactions of ordinary people are limited to themselves, 
their family, personal friends and fellow-countrymen. 
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and consistently, as Cicero says. Presumably, the reason why there is no counterpart of 
distress is the fact that the sage cannot assent to the impression concerning some present 
evil, i.e. vice, given that he is completely free from vice, and there is no evil producing 
impression nearby either (see also Sellars 2006: 119; Cooper 2005: 187). 
This last point is important. It means that the sage is completely tranquil and quiet, 
since he cannot be distressed about anything that happens to him, given that he cannot 
succumb to vice. It is not that he has some emotional reaction towards present vice, for 
instance equanimity and the like; he has no emotional reaction at all. One might even 
conclude from this that he cannot live in a society of fools. For, if he lived in such a 
society, then he should have had some emotional reaction towards vice. From this it might 
be concluded that there are not, nor have ever been, flesh and blood sages. In fact, they 
cannot exist as long as circumstances are such that they should live among the fools. It is 
not surprising, then, that Zeno in his Republic claims that, in his state, only the sages can 
be citizens, friends, relatives, and free (LS 67B). It is also understandable that Seneca 
thinks that in a morally corrupt society, sage must go mad: 
Every place is full of crime and vice ... If you want the wise man to be as angry 
as the baseness of the crimes demands, he must not only be angry, he must go 
mad” (On Anger 2.9, quoted by Knuuttila, 2004: 78). 
 
 
In the previous chapters I have argued that the Stoics introduced the notion of the sage as 
a theoretical model which is a consequence of some central philosophical concepts. Given 
the very strict criteria for knowledge, virtue and happiness, the sage is introduced as the 
only possible possessor of these attributes. Why did the Stoics introduce the idea of good 
feelings? Perhaps they wanted to respond to the charge of inhumanity which may be 
raised against them because of their dismissive view of emotions (Knuuttila 2004: 68). 
However, they wanted to stress another thing as well. 
 According to the Stoics, emotions are beliefs about what is good or bad. Since the 
fools have wrong conceptions of what is good or bad, every emotional reaction they have 
is wrong. Now, the Stoics must be well aware of the fact that there must be some 
emotional reaction towards that which is really good or bad, i.e. towards virtue or vice. 
What is really good and really bad must induce some emotional response. Otherwise, 
good and bad would have no practical import, which they most certainly have, since good 
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is, to put it simply, the object of wish, while bad is the object of avoidance. If there were 
no volition as, in Cicero’s words, “a wish for some object in accordance with reason”, 
then what is good could not be a motive for action. Thus, by their theory of good 
emotions, the Stoics just want to stress the simple fact that the good and the bad induce 
emotional reactions. Since they cannot induce emotional reactions in the fools, who have 
wrong conceptions of what is good and bad, the only subject of the emotional reaction 
towards what is really good and bad can be the sage.  
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
If there had been no Chrysippus, there would have been no Stoa, and if there had been no 
Stoa, there would have been no sages nor fools. Since there is ancient Stoic philosophy 
and even the nowadays popular parts of the Stoic allure put in blockbusters and “get 
together projects” – there is a notion of the sage and a notion of people in progress who 
are trying to achieve tranquility and consolidation with regards to future events. To 
become a sage, on the other hand, is not an easy task to fulfill nor is a sage an easy concept 
to grasp. This is probably the reason why the Stoic sage is presented in popular culture 
superficially, but not less iconically. As opposed to this, in Stoic philosophy, the concept 
of a sage is constructed out of concepts of their entire philosophical system. In order to 
understand the concept of the Stoic sage, one must understand the principles of the Stoic 
philosophical system. 
For the Stoics, wisdom is described as scientific knowledge of the divine and the 
human and of their causes, which covers everything that exists. Philosophy is a pursuit of 
wisdom or pursuit of scientific knowledge of the divine and the human and their causes 
– that is based on ethical, logical and physical virtue. Hence, philosophy is not only a 
pursuit of scientific knowledge of everything, but also a pursuit of virtue, and the only 
candidate for having a virtue is the sage. If there had been no unified virtue, there would 
have been no sage. 
Virtue as a core point of Stoic philosophy can be described as the firm mental 
state of never making a false supposition or making an assent to non-cognitive 
impression. It is an entirely rational quality. Virtue is a feature strictly reserved for sages 
who have knowledge of the divine and the human, and their causes. The sage’s 
omniscience, interpreted as freedom of ignorance, refers to the firmness, 
interconnectedness and unchangeability of his knowledge. Firm and unchangeable 
knowledge is a cognition which demands the like character – the character of a virtuous 
man. Virtuous man is someone who has a system of cognitions. As opposed to the sage’s 
possesion of virtues and knowledge, opinions or beliefs are characteristics of fools. 
Opinions or beliefs are defined as weak or false assents, which can be true or false. 
Virtuous person makes no mistakes since his system of cognitions is stable and 
intrinsically firm. In addition, knowledge requires a stable disposition to receive cognitive 
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impressions, and such stability is available only to the sage. Consequently, it is clear that 
sage’s mental state is tuned for having a knowledge that is always true, unchangeable and 
stable. The content of his knowledge is always cognitive impression. Fools can assent 
both to cognitive and incognitive impression without ever attaining knowledge, due to 
their weak assents.  
Moreover, virtue is a disposition to act for the right reason, which means that 
virtue is unchangeable reason or entirely rational quality. Only the entirely rational 
quality is beneficial quality, everything else is indifferent, and if a sage selects an 
indifferent thing, he would have selected one that is useful and preferred, hence his 
selection would be proper or appropriate.  
Emotions, being disobedient to reason, are contrary to nature, and by being 
contrary to nature they are contrary to the principle of reason, which is why emotions are 
false beliefs or their consequences. Emotions as beliefs are assents to evaluatively colored 
impressions, and all such assents, when made by the fools, are necessarily false, since 
they are assents to impressions that something is good or bad, while nothing is, according 
to the Stoics, good or bad except virtue and vice, respectively. However, not all assents 
to evaluatively colored impression are necessarily false, because impression can be of 
things that are really good or bad, namely, of virtues and vices. This is the source of the 
idea that there are emotions appropriate for the sage. However, the sage’s assent to true 
evaluative impressions cannot be called belief or opinion, but knowledge, since his acts 
of assent are firm and consistent. Thus, when a sage assents to an impression that 
something good is present, he feels joy. The present good is, of course, virtue, either his 
own or of his fellow sage. Hence, he can feel joy either towards himself or towards 
someone else. If he feels caution, this means that he assents to impression that some evil 
is impending. For instance, he is cautious about the possibility that he or some other sage 
might lose his virtue. Finally, volition concerns his expectation that he will possess virtue 
in the future as well. All these emotions he will feel according to reason, quietly and 
consistently.  
The ultimate goal of the sage’s life is happiness that comes from reason and 
consistent character, meaning that the necessary and sufficient condition for happiness is 
virtue. Virtue is the only constituent of happiness. Virtue demands firmness, persistence 
and right mental attitude towards indifferent things. By having virtue one has an expertise 
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concerning the whole of life. Happiness is the agreement with nature and living 
consistently with nature. It includes selecting things in accordance with individual nature 
concerning nature and life as a whole.  
Mr. Spock says: 
We have here an unusual opportunity to appraise the human mind, or to examine, 
in Earth terms, the roles of good and evil in a man – his negative side, which you 
call hostility, lust, violence, and his positive side, which Earth people express as 
compassion, love, tenderness.17  
By saying this, he subtly introduces an idea that I have tried to develop in this Thesis: for 
every positive attribute that the sage has, there is a counterpart negative attribute intended 
for the fool. To understand the sage’s positive attributes – his knowledge, virtue, 
happiness, and feelings – is to understand some basic notions of Stoic philosophy, since 
he is the only possible possessor of these attributes. Hence, the notion of the sage cannot 
be neglected or eliminated from the Stoic philosophical system. It is a necessary 
consequence of their central philosophical tenets. 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                
17  From “The Enemy Within”, fifth episode of the first season of Star Trek; see 
https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Star_Trek:_The_Original_Series 
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